

THE GLOBAL IMPACT OF THE P5'S VETO POWER

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the veto power that the P5 members of the UN Security Council are privy to remains relevant today or whether it has become an obsolete concept. This research paper intends to include a walk-through of the history and features of the veto power in the UN Security Council, along with a case study focused on two parallel perspectives. The first section of the case study focuses on the usage of the veto power by inspecting the official transcripts of the UN Security Council meetings in which a veto has been casted, and the second section of the case study surveys the international public's opinion on the veto power in light of the 2023 situation in Gaza by analysing all of the most prominent opinion posts on X (formerly Twitter) which have gained over 500 reposts and which clearly include the words "veto" or "veto power".

Keywords: United Nations, UN Security Council, veto power, United States of America, China, Russia, X (Twitter)

INTRODUCTION

"The Global Impact of The P5's Veto Power" intends to investigate whether the veto power granted to the P5 by the UN Security Council (henceforth stylised as UNSC) remains relevant or whether it has become obsolete. The paper will include the background of the veto power, along with a case study focused on two perspectives.

The first section of the case study will focus on the usage of the veto power by inspecting official transcripts of the UNSC meetings in which a veto has been cast, with the objective of answering the research question "what has the veto power been used for?" The second section will survey the public's opinion on the veto power in light of the 2023 situation in Gaza by analysing the most prominent opinion posts that have gained over 500 reposts on X (formerly Twitter) and which clearly include the words "veto" or "veto power", thus aiming to validate or invalidate this paper's hypothesis, that of "the existence of the veto power has hindered the work and credibility of the United Nations" by answering the second research question, "what is the public opinion on the right to veto?"

The paper will contain two parts: *Theoretical perspectives* and *Case study*. The theoretical part will explain the UNSC's features, will describe

what the veto power is and why it has been adopted, will enumerate the states that possess the right to veto and will offer some perspectives on the veto power as seen through the lens of both its supporters and its critics. The case study section will afterwards take a look at the UN Security Council Meetings & Outcomes Tables posted on a certified UN site, analysing its Veto List portion¹ which contains the meetings in which a veto has been formally cast, will examine what the veto power has been used for, will take note of why the states have cast it and will attempt to deduce whether the right to veto has been abused or whether it has been cast fairly.

Subsequently, the paper will also scrutinize the public's opinion on the usage of veto power by examining the most liked and reposted posts pertaining to Gaza's 2023 humanitarian crisis which contain the words "veto" or "veto power", which have been posted between October-December 2023 and which have obtained a minimum of 500 reposts. It is important to mention though, that the number of posts with over 500 reposts may have changed considerably since the writing of this paper, as the situation in Gaza continues to attract the attention of more users every day.

¹ Dag Hammarskjöld Library, UN. "UN Security Council Meetings & Outcomes Tables" via <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick>

The research method used for the case study is content analysis; more specifically an analysis of some of the UNSC's official documents which contain transcripts of the meetings in which the five founding members have formally used their veto power, as well as an analysis of social media posts that fit the requirements listed above and which express personal opinions on the right to veto. The relevant data that will be extracted from the UNSC's documents will be the agenda item, the country that has used the veto and the offered reason for it. The data collected from social media posts will venture to show the opinion trends about the right to veto and, finally, the paper will conclude with whether its usage has, per overall, helped or hindered the work of the UN and its reputation worldwide.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

The United Nations Security Council, often referred to as the UN Security Council or UNSC, is one of the six principal organs of the UN. The role of the UNSC is stipulated in the UN Charter, which defines the reason for the UNSC's existence as maintaining international peace and collective security by determining "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression"² and by providing recommendations or measures to be taken by its member states.

According to Article 23 of the UN Charter, "the Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council."³ After the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, its spot as a permanent member of the UNSC P5 was passed onto its legal successor state, Russia.

The five founding members represented the most powerful states in the world at the time, and were thus "granted the special status of Permanent Member States at the Security Council, along with a special voting power known as the right to veto. It was agreed by the drafters that if any one of the five permanent members cast a negative vote in the 15-member Security Council, the resolution or decision would not be approved."⁴ Article 27 of the same

Charter delineates on which matters the right to veto may apply: "Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting."⁵ In other words, the right to veto entails the P5's ability to block any draft resolutions presented to the UNSC in the context of non-procedural matters. By using their veto against a draft, the resolution in question cannot be adopted by the member states and therefore cannot be put into action.

The concept of veto power was not invented by the UN however. It was introduced by its predecessor, the League of Nations. Article 5 of the League of Nations Covenant specified that "except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant, or by agreements conferring certain powers on the League of Nations, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting"⁶, therefore granting all member states the right to veto. In light of the ever-growing number of states applying to become a member though, the organisation's decision-making process became more sluggish with each added member, as the large number of countries with divergent, at times distinctly opposing, interests struggled to reach an agreement on the League's draft resolutions.

In an attempt to rectify its predecessor's mistake while preserving the veto system, the UN chose to limit the right to veto to the organisation's five founding states, otherwise known as the P5 (shorthand for "permanent 5"). The reason behind the UN's choice to maintain the right to veto was because the five "made it clear [...] that they were not going to accept the UN Charter without the veto provision."⁷ Seeing as the founding members were the only nations capable of enforcing the UN's decisions on a large scale at the time, the veto power was adopted in spite of the "smaller and medium powers [who] considered that giving the Great Powers

⁵ United Nations. (1945). *Idem*, Article 27

⁶ League of Nations. (1919). *Covenant of the League of Nations*, Article 5 via <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b9854.html>

⁷ Schindlmayr, T. (2001). *Obstructing the Security Council: The Use of the Veto in the Twentieth Century*. *Journal of the History of International Law / Revue D'histoire Du Droit International*, 3 (2), p.223

² United Nations. (1945). *Charter of the United Nations*, 1 UNTS XVI, Article 39 via <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>

³ United Nations. (1945). *Idem*, Article 23

⁴ United Nations Security Council. "Voting System" via <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/voting-system>

both a permanent seat in the Security Council and the right to block substantive questions was incompatible with the principle of the sovereign equality of states.”⁸

In response to veto power being granted to the P5, the Australian Minister for External Affairs declared his hesitation on the matter and alluded to the possibility of such a power being misused for the Great Powers’ gain and national interests than solely for, or rather even against, the well-being of the UN’s goals: “I can only hope, [...], that during the next few years the Great Powers will demonstrate to the world by their actions in the Council that they will not in practice exercise to the full the veto rights which they possess under the Charter. [...] The Great Powers can perform a great service to the world if they demonstrate in practice that the powers given to them under the Charter will be used with restraint and in the interests of the United Nations as a whole.”⁹

With the possibility laid out in front of the member states, the UN gathered to create a “backdoor” to circumvent the right to veto in case one of the P5 members were to ever use a veto against the organisation’s purpose, and titled it “Uniting for Peace” resolution 377 A (V) in 1950. More specifically, this resolution was adopted after such a scenario nearly became reality, “as a response to the strategy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to block any determination by the Security Council on measures to be taken in order to protect the Republic of Korea against the aggression launched against it by military forces from North Korea”¹⁰ and it was invoked for the first time in 1951 after repeated vetoes from the USSR on the situation in Korea. However, a “fundamental constitutional issue is whether one of the central features of the resolution—the General Assembly’s ability to recommend the use of force against states—clashes with the prohibition against the threat or use of force contained in article 2 (4) of the Charter.”¹¹ It’s possible to argue both in favour and against its constitutionality, and moreover, “the Assembly’s resolution constituted a recommendation without the binding force of a Security Council resolution”.¹²

⁸ Schindlmayr, T. (2001). *Ibidem*

⁹ Schindlmayr, T. (2001). *Idem*, p.224

¹⁰ Audiovisual Library of International Law, UN. (1950). *Uniting for Peace General Assembly resolution 377 (V)*. via <https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html>

¹¹ Carswell, A. J. (2013). Unblocking the UN Security Council: The *Uniting for Peace* Resolution, *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*

¹² Carswell, A. J. (2013). *Ibidem*

As such, it has rarely been made use of, having only been invoked 13 times between 1950 and December 2023.^{13 14}

The “Uniting for Peace” resolution is not the only attempt to circumvent the founding members’ right to veto. Ever since veto power was granted to the P5, several critics have come forward to express their disapproval and present the UN with various reforms pertaining to the veto as to limit the likelihood of a founding member abusing its influence over the UNSC’s decision-making through the use or threat of a veto. These criticisms have by and large touched on the increasing fear that the P5 might use their power to protect their national or geopolitical interests while blocking resolutions that could guarantee peace, as was the case with Russia’s veto of the draft that denounced its annexation of Crimea in 2014.¹⁵

Among the proposed reforms have been “the Non-Aligned Movement’s idea to confine the right of veto to decisions made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; the Organisation of African Unity’s proposal that for a veto to become effective it should be exercised by at least two permanent members; the attempt to eliminate the veto’s use in regard to the selection of the Secretary-General; as well as efforts to find ways to overrule a veto cast by only one permanent member by a majority decision of either the Council or the General Assembly. There was even a plan to adopt [...] ‘rotating permanent seats’ in the Council so that the states enjoying the right of veto would not be known in advance.”¹⁶

In contrast, the supporters of the right to veto have mainly stated that the veto power is a reliable way of maintaining the international order and of upholding the peace, since any drafted resolution that holds the potential to spark conflict between the member states can be blocked through a veto.

CASE STUDY

Content analysis is a research method “that provides a systematic and objective means to

¹³ Security Council Report. (2013). *Security Council Deadlocks and Uniting for Peace: An Abridged History* via <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/about-the-un-security-council>

¹⁴ McAlpin, N. (2023). “Can UN Resolution 377 be used to overturn the US’s Gaza ceasefire veto?”, via <https://www.newarab.com/news/can-un-resolution-377-help-overturn-uss-gaza-war-veto>

¹⁵ Sengupta, S. (2014). “Russia Vetoes U.N. Resolution on Crimea” via <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/world/europe/russia-vetoes-un-resolution-on-crimea.html>

¹⁶ Blätter, A., & Williams, P. D. (2011). *The Responsibility Not To Veto. Global Responsibility to Protect*, 3 (3), p.307

make valid inferences from verbal, visual, or written data in order to describe and quantify specific phenomena.”¹⁷ It entails “selecting the unit of analysis, creating and defining the categories, pretesting the category definitions and rules, assessing reliability and validity, revising the coding rules if necessary, pretesting the revised category scheme, coding all the data, and reassessing reliability and validity”¹⁸ and was chosen for this study in order to examine the ways in which the right to veto has been utilised and whether the P5 have a tendency to use it for peacekeeping purposes or for national interests, as well as in order to investigate what the international opinion is on the existence of a veto power in the UNSC. Content analysis is the most representative method for this study as it allows for several official documents and social media posts to be evaluated at once.

THE VETO LIST: THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES

Since the adoption of the right to veto in 1945 and until December 2023, the P5 have, altogether, utilised it more than 200 times, the “hidden vetoes” whereby “a permanent member threatens to use its veto if a certain measure or statement is put to the vote”¹⁹ notwithstanding.

According to the UNSC’s Veto List, the agenda items that the founding members have used their veto on in the beginning of the UN’s existence have been matters of admittance of new states into the UN, more than half of which were blocked by Russia. Although not explicitly declared in all of the transcripts, a large number of documents directly state the reasoning for the usage of a veto as a way to block a respective country’s admittance into the UN, as was the case with USSR’s veto against Ireland’s membership in 1947 in response to Ireland’s favourable relations with the Axis Powers and lack of prior relations of a similar sort with the USSR.²⁰

Similarly, a majority of the documents contain the reasoning for voting in favour of the country’s admittance, as was the case with the UK’s vote in

favour of Portugal in 1946 due to their alliance as well as due to Portugal’s “great contribution to the culture and civilization of Europe” and its previous aid towards the Allies.²¹ Though not a veto, the reasons given by the P5 members for voting in favour of a country’s admittance are of equal importance in the endeavour of analysing what motives they may have for using a veto in the cases where such a reason isn’t declared. However, the UNSC’s dilemma of a P5 member state invoking its right to veto against a membership proposal has ceased since “the last veto of this type was cast by the United States in 1976”²² and therefore this issue does not bear relevance for the study at hand beyond what has already been briefly touched upon in the paragraphs above.

Beyond the admittance of new members, among the most frequent agenda items on the Veto List are “the situation in the Middle East” (mentioned 48 times), vetoed by Russia, China and the US; “the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” (mentioned 25 times out of the 48), vetoed by the US; and “the situation in the occupied Arab territories” (mentioned 18 times), vetoed by the US. Since the gap between these agenda items and the next one in order of mentions is significantly wide, with the fourth appearing only 8 times, this study will draw the line at analysing the three issues listed above. Seeing as all of these agenda items pertain to similar subjects, the study will follow the consistency of the P5 states’ statements regarding their usage of the veto rather than focusing on every item in question.

In 1984, the USSR vetoed the draft that entailed the existence of a multinational monitoring force in Lebanon which would serve as a peacekeeping force, declaring the reason as “the presence of the multinational force in Lebanese territory not only did not help normalise the situation in Lebanon, as Washington had self-confidently affirmed in the past; but, on the contrary, it further worsened the danger facing the Lebanese people and Government.”²³ Furthermore, USSR’s representative stated that “over and above withdrawal from Beirut of the multinational force, are of course the need to withdraw foreign warships from the Lebanese coast and to have guarantees that there would be no resumption of artillery fire, air strikes or

¹⁷ Downe-Wamboldt, B. (1992). *Content analysis: Method, applications, and issues*. *Health Care for Women International*, 13 (3)

¹⁸ Downe-Wamboldt, B. (1992). *Ibidem*

¹⁹ Wouters, J. & Ruys, T. (2005). *Security Council reform: a new veto for a new century? Egmont Paper*, no. 9, p.9

²⁰ UN, SCOR. (1947). 186th meeting at 3 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.186, p.2041

²¹ UN, SCOR. (1946). 57th meeting at 1:12 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.57, p.104

²² Wouters, J. & Ruys, T. (2005). *Idem*, p.11

²³ UN, SCOR. (1984). 2519th meeting at 3 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.2519, p.2

any other interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon by the multinational force" in reply to the US' military presence in Lebanon.²⁴

In 2019, Russia and China vetoed a draft resolution that contained a call for the cessation of hostilities in Syria which condemned Russia's airstrikes and demanded that anti-terrorist efforts must take into account the established norms about international humanitarian aid, human rights and refugee law. Russia defended its usage of veto power as follows: "Regrettably, the content of the draft resolution and the course of its preparation are clear indications of the real objectives of our colleagues — to save the international terrorists who are entrenched in Idlib from their final defeat and present Russia and Syria as being guilty of creating the situation in Idlib. I would like to emphasise from the start and in particular the fact that the authors of the draft text have ignored the need to combat terrorists is the very factor that does not allow us to support the draft resolution before us."²⁵ China also defended its usage of the veto power: "Terrorist organisations continue to expand their sphere of influence in the north-west region of Syria. That is the source of the humanitarian issue in Idlib and poses a grave risk to safety and security in the region. [...] However, unfortunately the draft resolution that was just put to the vote did not touch upon the essence of the issue or address China's core concerns."²⁶ Russia and China have jointly vetoed three other resolutions on this topic, stating that "the new draft by the co-pen holders is like the old one, with the same one-sided approach and disconnection from the reality on the ground."²⁷

Following the draft resolution of 1972 which refused to equate the Munich massacre of eleven Israelis to Israel's invasion and subsequent bombing of Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon villages and which demanded an immediate end to the hostilities, the US stated, after vetoing it, that "it was said here today that we might be making a constructive move if we could contain the situation by calling for a cessation of all military operations. But can anybody suggest that the situation today is unrelated to the Munich massacre? It is related."²⁸ Likewise, in 1982 the US was the only member of the UNSC who voted against the draft resolution

that demanded "that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon"²⁹ by stating that "the conflict in Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border is complex in its origin" and that the motive for its veto was the unbalanced phrasing of the draft resolution.³⁰

The US maintained its opinions regarding Israel throughout every meeting, declaring in 1988 that "we have opposed the draft resolution considered by the Council today because it criticises the actions of one party while ignoring the attacks and reprisals that have originated on the other side of the border. It is precisely this cyclical pattern of violence that has perpetuated the suffering in this troubled area. Moreover, in requesting that Israel cease all attacks against Lebanese territory regardless of provocation this draft resolution would deny to Israel its inherent right to defend itself. This we cannot accept."³¹

The three most recent usages of the veto as of December 2023 were on the subject of the Palestinian question, two of which were invoked by the US and one by Russia and China. The first, vetoed by the US, included an immediate humanitarian ceasefire and a condemnation of Israel in light of its "indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population and civilian objects in the Gaza Strip, including yesterday's missile attack on the Al Ahli Hospital".³² The US cast its veto against it because "the text failed to acknowledge that Israel has the right to defend itself against terrorism, consistent with international law."³³

A week after the first veto, the US presented a draft that "unequivocally condemns the heinous terrorist attacks by Hamas and other terrorist groups. It affirms the right of Member States to defend themselves against the threat to peace and security posed by acts of terrorism. It urges all parties to fully respect and comply with their obligations under international law."³⁴ Russia and China's joint veto was, in the words of the Russian representative, invoked because the draft "does not include a call for a ceasefire or a condemnation of the indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects in Gaza. [...] A

²⁴ UN, SCOR. (1984). *Idem*, p.3

²⁵ UN, SCOR. (2019). 8623rd meeting at 11:45 am, UN Doc. S/PV.8623, p.2

²⁶ UN, SCOR. (2019). *Idem*, p.9

²⁷ UN, SCOR. (2020). UN Doc. S/2020/693, Annex XVIII, p.22

²⁸ UN, SCOR. (1972). 1662nd meeting at 4 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.1662, p.7

²⁹ UN, SCOR. (1982). 2377th meeting at 10 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.2377, p.2

³⁰ UN, SCOR. (1982). *Idem*, p.3

³¹ UN, SCOR. (1988). 2832nd meeting at 11 am, UN Doc. S/PV.2832, p.29

³² UN, SCOR. (2023). 9442nd meeting at 10 am, UN Doc. S/PV.9442, p.2

³³ UN, SCOR. (2023). *Idem*, p.4

³⁴ UN, SCOR. (2023). 9453rd meeting at 3:40 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.9453, p.2

separate and major legal problem for the draft resolution is its reference to Israel's right to self-defence, which, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice [...] is inapplicable in the case of an occupying Power, which is what Israel is with regard to the Palestinian territory."³⁵

In December 2023, the US' latest veto was accompanied by the following statement: "Any ceasefire that leaves Hamas in control of Gaza would deny Palestinian civilians the chance to build something better for themselves. For that reason, although the United States strongly supports durable peace, in which Israelis and Palestinians can live in peace and security, we do not support the draft resolution's call for an unsustainable ceasefire that will only plant the seeds for the next war."³⁶ Due to the repeated usage of the veto power on the subject of Gaza's humanitarian crisis, the next subsection will attempt to gauge the public opinion on the necessity of the veto power or the lack thereof.

PUBLIC OPINIONS ON X (FORMERLY TWITTER)

The present section will examine all of the posts from the X social media platform that visibly include the words "veto" or "veto power" which have been posted between October-December 2023, which have gained over 500 reposts and which contain personal opinions about the right to veto. Every post has been obtained via screencap ("screen capture") and merged into an unedited collage, as shown in Fig.1 for ease of access. The original posts have also been linked in the bibliography.

The exact wording submitted into X's advanced search feature in order to find relevant posts pertaining to the right to veto was the following:

- "veto" min_retweets:500 lang:en until:2023-12-31 since:2023-10-01
- "veto power" min_retweets:500 lang:en until:2023-12-31 since:2023-10-01
- "veto" ""veto power"" min_retweets:500 lang:en until:2023-12-31 since:2023-10-01

X was chosen as the most pertinent social media platform for this case study because of its background as a haven for digital activism and because of the widespread ease with which its user base can disseminate important information. The decision to concentrate on the most recent usages of the veto power, namely on

the issue of the crimes against humanity being committed against the civilians of Gaza in 2023, was prompted by the footage perpetually being disclosed by Gaza's journalists and regular citizens alike, but also by Israel's own forces on the ground, directly into the platform's main page, thus transforming the topic into one of the most well-documented and therefore most talked about crises of the 21st century.

As a result of photographs and videos comprised of mutilated and deceased bodies of Palestinian children, women and men, flattened neighbourhoods and bombarded hospitals, mosques and churches appearing on every X user's main page, alongside the US' decision to veto multiple draft resolutions that would have led to an immediate cessation of hostilities, allowed humanitarian aid into Gaza and prevented thousands of deaths, the situation in Gaza has sparked a powerful distaste for the US and its positive relations with Israel, and has cast a significant shadow of doubt over the UN's *raison d'être* which is presently easily noticeable on the platform.



(Fig.1. X posts regarding the veto power, October-December 2023)

All of the relevant posts obtained from the aforementioned searches, as displayed in Fig.1, showcase the X user base's negative opinions in regards to the US' usage of its right to veto in favour of Israel, vetoes which have blocked urgent humanitarian aid from entering Gaza several times since the beginning of October 2023.

³⁵ UN, SCOR. (2023). *Idem*, p.3

³⁶ UN, SCOR. (2023). 9499th meeting at 3:30 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.9499, p.4

From the total of 17 posts obtained that matched the preestablished requirements of the study, 10 posts show a growing mistrust in the UN and the international law it upholds and 7 posts openly criticise the US for its usage of vetoes on the draft resolutions that contained calls for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, 4 of the posts imply or outright state that the UN's existence is pointless, 3 declare that the international law is biased in favour of the West, 1 is of the opinion that honest countries should resign from the UN, and 1 insists that the US should be stripped of its UN powers, though it is unclear whether the poster's opinion extends only to the US' right to veto or to the US' right to be a member of the UN.

CONCLUSIONS

The present study has looked into what the veto power has been used for since inception and whether it has mostly been abused or used fairly, with the findings proving that the five founding states have primarily prioritised their national or geopolitical interests rather than the UN's goals, though they have also used their veto power to stop some of the draft resolutions that may have led to disastrous effects.

This paper also surveyed what the international opinion on the right to veto was at the end of 2023 on the X social platform, and the findings proved that the UN was, and continues to be, met with increasing suspicion about its *raison d'être* due to its repeated inability to stop conflicts as a consequence of the P5's veto power. Although the US has been criticised for how it has chosen to use its right to veto, the overall tendency of X users seems to signal that the US as a nation is the problem, and not necessarily the veto power itself. This is in stark contrast to the phrasing of the UNSC member states' representatives, who have regularly alluded to the right to veto as being the cause behind the UN's failures through statements such as "the Organization has again been prevented, by the negative vote of one of the Council's permanent members [...]"³⁷, "have again put political calculations above the needs of the [...] people"³⁸ and "essentially prohibiting the Security Council from intervening."³⁹

This study was based on the hypothesis that "the existence of the veto power has hindered the

work and credibility of the United Nations", the hypothesis having been fully validated through the research questions "what has the veto power been used for?" and "what is the public opinion on the right to veto?"

That said, the present study is greatly limited by the analysis of only a select few subjects vetoed by the founding members, mainly the US, Russia and China, rather than an evaluation of each and every veto on the list. It is also limited by the analysis of a small number of posts from a period of three consecutive months, on the single subject of the Palestinian question and the Gaza-Israel situation, with a specific number of reposts, as well as on a single social media platform.

In order to gauge the public opinion in regards to the right to veto in a more representative manner, subsequent studies on the other agenda items vetoed by the P5, on other social media platforms where such opinions may have been expressed, on other periods of time and through the use of other research methods are mandatory.

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³⁷ UN, SCOR. (1984). 2519th meeting at 3 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.2519, p.9

³⁸ UN, SCOR. (2020). UN Doc. S/2020/661, Annex 20, p.26

³⁹ UN, SCOR. (2023). 9499th meeting at 3:30 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.9499, p.3

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Case study, part two: X posts

1. @muglare. (2023). X platform. *via* <https://twitter.com/muglare/status/1734682038077419907> (Accessed 14 January 2024)
2. @womenbaseball1. (2023). X platform. *via* <https://twitter.com/womenbaseball1/status/1734243937093579001> (Accessed 14 January 2024)
3. @JvpAction. *via* <https://twitter.com/JvpAction/status/1733238954453831725> (2023). X platform. (Accessed 14 January 2024)
4. @angeloinchina. (2023). X platform. *via* <https://twitter.com/angeloinchina/status/1737665327868391581> (Accessed 12 January 2024)
5. @MSF. (2023). X platform. *via* <https://twitter.com/MSF/status/1733886793463074892> (Accessed 14 January 2024)
6. @tparsi. (2023). X platform. *via* <https://twitter.com/tparsi/status/1739481850941198419> (Accessed 14 January 2024)
7. @MariamBarghouti. (2023). X platform. *via* <https://twitter.com/MariamBarghouti/status/1723419102738313586> (Accessed 12 January 2024)
8. @MichelleHux. (2023). X platform. *via* <https://twitter.com/MichelleHux/status/1734199438971953624> (Accessed 14 January 2024)
9. @mrs_socialista. (2023). X platform. *via* https://twitter.com/mrs_socialista/status/1733253282326360182 (Accessed 12 January 2024)
10. @FreeMsian. (2023). X platform. *via* <https://twitter.com/FreeMsian/status/1714660325432451351> (Accessed 14 January 2024)
11. @JamilFarouk. (2023). X platform. *via* <https://twitter.com/JamilFarouk/status/1733368729394626658> (Accessed 14 January 2024)
12. @realnikohouse. (2023). X platform. *via* <https://twitter.com/realnikohouse/status/1733902957458993489> (Accessed 12 January 2024)
13. @LexiAlex. (2023). X platform. *via* <https://twitter.com/LexiAlex/status/1738181769340592557> (Accessed 12 January 2024)

Case study, part one: UN veto documents

1. UN, SCOR. (1946). 57th meeting at 1:12 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.57, p.104
2. UN, SCOR. (1947). 186th meeting at 3 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.186, p.2041
3. UN, SCOR. (1972). 1662nd meeting at 4 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.1662, p.7
4. UN, SCOR. (1982). 2377th meeting at 10 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.2377, p.2-3
5. UN, SCOR. (1984). 2519th meeting at 3 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.2519, p.2-9
6. UN, SCOR. (1988). 2832nd meeting at 11 am, UN Doc. S/PV.2832, p.29
7. UN, SCOR. (2019). 8623rd meeting at 11:45 am, UN Doc. S/PV.8623, p.2-9
8. UN, SCOR. (2020). UN Doc. S/2020/661, Annex 20, p.26
9. UN, SCOR. (2020). UN Doc. S/2020/693, Annex XVIII, p.22
10. UN, SCOR. (2023). 9442nd meeting at 10 am, UN Doc. S/PV.9442, p.2-4
11. UN, SCOR. (2023). 9453rd meeting at 3:40 pm, UN Doc. S/PV.9453, p.2-3