

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS BETWEEN MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY. THE CASE OF THE FAILED INTERVENTION IN RWANDA

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ABSTRACT

Following the second half of 20th century, the debate on the humanitarian intervention has gained momentum on the international scene. Tensions have raised between the “solidarists” whose claims are related to the promotion of human rights and state’s moral obligation to intervene to alleviate human suffering based on the Preamble, Article 1, Article 55 and Article 56 of the UN Charter and “realists” who affirm that state sovereignty and the banning of outside interference in the internal jurisdiction of states are crucial because they are also legally stipulated throughout the UN Charter, more specifically in Article 2. By the end of the century, Rwanda has faced one the roughest genocides in the world as a result of hatred between two groups who have been ethically constructed as being totally different. The response from the international stage did not materialize. In this study I will address how the motives behind Rwanda’s intervention can be attributed to one of the two conceptions. It might seem intuitive to consider that the failed intervention is due to the state sovereignty rule, but in fact the naming of genocide as being a civil war prevented the external forces to act. The findings will provide an analysis of how morality and the respect for human rights have been quantified in number of deaths needed to use the force in a humanitarian mission. However, the new doctrine of Responsibility to Protect(R2P) transformed the traditional way of thinking about humanitarian interventions.

Keywords: ethnicity, genocide, R2P, hatred, Rwanda, intervention, sovereignty, morality

INTRODUCTION

The paper, “*Humanitarian interventions between moral responsibility and state sovereignty – the case of failed intervention in Rwanda*” will present a two-folded analysis: on the one hand, I shall provide the reader a historical background highlighting the most relevant events since Rwanda lost its autonomy and became a European colony until the end of genocide. On the other hand, I shall emphasize the role of global moral responsibility in humanitarian interventions with the new developments that followed. My inquiry will start with defining the most vocal theories of moral responsibility then in the next chapter I shall extend the theoretical conceptualization of moral responsibility to critical actors who emerged as decision-makers in the decision to intervene. Their course of actions can successfully reveal to which moral doctrine they have adhere to and why. Following the intrusive analysis,

the last chapter is dedicated to the expansion of moral controversies around the concept of humanitarian assistance and intervention. Moreover, my case-study further explores the future of the “Responsibility to Protect(R2P)” in light of the failure of the 1990’s intervention in Rwanda. Coupled with the dramatic consequences, is R2P strong enough to prevent such humanitarian disasters from happening?

Rwanda faced some economic fluctuations during the period of western interreference. The country experienced economic growth because it was supported by the donor nations, but it only focused on exporting coffee and when the demand decreased, the state faced serious downturns. The western states, United Kingdom, France and Belgium provided money in the form of development aid or structural adjustment funds. As it was the case with other African nations, the strategy was to push for liberalization. I believe

these actions are evocative to the Cold War practices when the two superpowers tried expanding their empires. However, this time it was through consent, through the promotion of western, liberal values as being the universal values, while during the Cold War, the tactics were employed through proxy wars.

If such aid would have been interrupted during the period when the Rwandan government deliberately killed civilians, perhaps the genocide could have been prevented. However, the massacres and the violence continued even when the UN's missions were deployed.

THEORIES OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

In the writing of this thesis, the most relevant theories of global moral responsibility have been made use of for the scope of analyzing and identifying the correct paradigm that described the actions of the actors. What is understood by the actions of the actors is the simple, yet paradoxically complex question of whether to intervene or not. I believe the whole debate eventually comes down to two opposing arguments favoring or rejecting humanitarian intervention: moral responsibility and state sovereignty. Theoretically, there are a number of academic accounts and doctrines who have been positioning themselves into the humanitarian intervention's spectrum and have used their discourses to legitimize the real actions of individual state actors and international organizations, such as United Nations. Therefore, I consider it imperative to have a brief background about the connotations of moral responsibility and state sovereignty explained by the widely known international relations theories. Notwithstanding, the following theories have been selected out of the much-expanded array because I consider them the most relevant.

Utilitarianism is the moral theory which supports the righteousness and morality of an action only if it brings results that are better and beneficial than maintaining the status quo. The whole doctrine supports the consequentialist claim and applies the principle of maximizing utility to virtually every aspect of human life. As regards humanitarian interventions, utilitarianists consider

“to put it simply, if our goal in humanitarian intervention is to alleviate or minimize human suffering, then the level of human suffering in question must involve life-threatening conditions and deprivations on a significantly large scale”

because otherwise, by intervening for less, the heavily-guarded practice of non-intervention would be undermined (Heinze, 2006, pp. 283-285).

The justice of the intervention is analysed in terms of how much utility and wellbeing the desired outcomes can bring compared to the initial situation. The theory goes into two different and sometimes opposing directions: act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. The first supports the idea that one state should intervene if it can save more lives than it costs, that is a utilitarian calculus about affirmative forecasts. The latter, sponsors the rule concept in taking the decision. Moral evaluation is placed on the collective decision to act and therefore the judgement comes from coordinated actions of more individuals who would behave in the same way. If the individual preference does not correspond with the group preference, then the consequences are not considered morally adequate to act upon. Therefore humanitarian intervention might fail if it is not conducted for the sake of everyone involved. (Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003, pp. 22-25).

As regards the solidarist case, I shall review the most important and vocal moral theories and arguments that supported the liberal claim for the intervention. Hugo Grotius, the father of solidarist international society theory based his arguments on the natural law, therefore moral duties are the result of the common humanity. According to him

“if a tyrant practices atrocities against his subjects, which no just man can approve, it would not follow that other may not take up arms for them”,

therefore justifying the right to intervene (Grotius, 2012, p. 54). Firstly, Grotius' arguments were based on the universal right of external actors to protect the rule of law because of the supremacy that is placed on it. Therefore, its position extends to the right of intervening in the name of offering protection and securing international law. Secondly, foreign state actors are authorized to use force to protect other nations who face cruel oppression because there is a natural right of any person to be protected from death and that protection can only come from an outsider because the rightful guardian who should have been the state, failed in achieving its duties (Criddle, 2013, pp. 474-478). Fernando Tesón, the neoclassical liberal theory contributor confers the principle of human rights protection a greater importance than to the principle of non-intervention. He believes that

waiting for the state consent can increase the danger of human rights violations as

“governments that massively violate human rights forfeit their right to protection of the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention, and as a result, other states are morally entitled to intervene”.

This moral duty comes from a much general obligation to rescue people who are in danger, even with military force if needed (Tesón, 2001, p. 6). On the other side, Nicholas J. Wheeler emphasizes that

“only if the non-humanitarian motives behind an intervention undermine its stated humanitarian purposes”.

the action can be considered illegitimate (Nicholas J. Wheeler, 2000, p. 39).

Alongside the above mention theories, there is also communitarianism, a political theory largely influenced by Michael Walzer. His entire approach as regards the moral duty to intervene was postulated around the popular statement

“Humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) to acts „that shock the moral conscience of mankind”. He goes on to argue how the moral conscience can be analysed in terms of *“the moral convictions of ordinary men and women, acquired in the course of their everyday activities”* (Walzer, 1981, p. 107).

Humanitarian interventions in the view of Michael Walzer should be permissible because there is a moral duty which comes from the inherited cultures, thus a product of the communities. He claims that each individual belongs to a community, and the importance of the latter should be taken more seriously. Thus, within the community, the individuals agree to specific set of norms that are binding on each other, therefore the moral duty to intervene would be recognized as long as it fits the cultural beliefs of the community (Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003, p. 32-34). On another note, Hedley Bull did not perceived humanitarian intervention as a moral obligation acknowledge by the community, as there was no actual tendency or custom for the states to actually interfere for such matters. Thus, he was concerned with the undermining of the international order if states would resort to such unfamiliar acts (Curtis, 2012).

One of the greatest challenges to humanitarian interventions comes from Realism. According to the adherents to this theory, when it comes to almost every foreign policy decision to invade or intervene in the territory of another country, states always pursue their national interests. Thus, this principle also extends to humanitarian intervention, who in the view of realists, the decision is not taken to safeguard human suffering. Samuel P. Huntington, American political scientist argued that

“it is morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible that members of the [United States] Armed Forces should be killed to prevent Somalis from killing each other”.

Therefore, morality in his discourses is used to legitimate the superiority of protecting national citizens and interests over foreign nationals (Huntington, 1992). In addition, ethics and morality are treated as irrelevant in politics and international relations, thus for the states there is no such moral duty to intervene for external actors, as it is that state's responsibility to protect its own citizens. Another argument against humanitarian intervention is the lack of a system of control that could establish when the act is allowed, as states are self-interested and sovereignty could easily be abused if the practice would be allowed on a larger scale (Smith, 1998).

Finally, as regards the cosmopolitan view on the humanitarian intervention and humanitarian protection, there are a number of variations which can be summarized in three stances. First, for cosmopolitan theorists, the individual human's rights are the most important as opposed to state interest. Secondly, preserving egalitarianism is the ultimate concern because individuals are all moral equals, regardless of nationality. Thirdly, all rights and duties have a universal value therefore the common humanity is the ground rule for acting in cases of terrible cruelties. Cosmopolitanism favours the switch from the domestic sphere towards the international realm and individual or state responsibilities become collective responsibilities. Unlike the traditional theories, cosmopolitanism claims that states can benefit from the right of non-intervention only if they prove they can protect their own citizens, but as in the case of humanitarian intervention, the moral duty is a part of a universal right and obligation to impede terrible disasters on humanity (Sim, 2016).

Throughout this paper, I shall identify which paradigm corresponds to the actions that led to the genocide and later, to the humanitarian interventions organised by United Nations. As regards my academic opinion about the morality of humanitarian interventions, I identify with the solidarist view as I believe there is both a legal right and a moral obligation to intervene in the cases where human lives face serious threats. Nonetheless, I don't agree with the idea that there must be a threshold for quantifying human suffering just as a simple calculus, but I do agree with the fact that humanitarian concern should be the only justifiable reason for impeding the territorial integrity of an external state. Therefore, I conclude with the cosmopolitan argument that there is a universal moral obligation for individuals and states alike for protecting human rights' deprivations.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITIES

There is a growing body of literature which links the misconceptions about the Tutsi and Hutu to the carry out of the genocide. Moreover, the two categories have largely been defined and differentiated in terms of their race, ethnicity, political power, occupation, caste and socioeconomic status. In the following pages, I shall address the events and the two groups by only categorizing them in terms of demographics, the majority versus the minority. Following the debate, two sides have emerged: one that claims that Hutu and Tutsi do not portray striking differences, but only in terms of their occupations and class which were conceived as being "normal" to any community of people. On the other side, there are those who challenge the first predilection and argue that Hutu has constituted an authentic group who migrated at different times and has different ancestors with different culture, apart from Rwandan Tutsi. Nonetheless, Hutu after being subjugated by the ruling Tutsi into the territory of Rwanda, their distinctness has been deliberately dissolved and their social position was weakened to force them into inferiority but the whole process reverted when the genocide was launched on the formerly superior Tutsi (Mamdani, 2001).

I believe one major drawback of these approaches is the fact that differences can also be imagined for political purposes, therefore it is intuitive to determine which group has been supporting which side. Taking to account what followed and what were the motivations of genocide, the Hutu always maintained

that they were a distinct ethnic and racial group, while Tutsi perpetuated the idea that there is only a class differences between the two groups on the grounds of their division of labor. Additionally, there is also a debate between colonialists and nationalists who pushed their arguments in their works. Therefore, it is difficult to explain which side has made legitimate assumptions about the constructed identities, but I shall attempt to provide the reader with an in-depth analysis.

Rwanda, a landlocked country situated in East-Central African, south of the Equator is one of the smallest nations in Africa. However, it ranks the 15th fastest growing economy with 12.5 million people due to rapid economic growth. Life expectancy has also increased and by 2019, the average age was 69 years. But Rwanda's position in the world has not always been like this, it has only improved after 2000 after experiencing a dramatic genocide which killed half a million people in the course of 100 days (The World Bank, 2020)

Since Stone Age, Rwanda has started to be inhabited by three main groups of people: Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. Firstly, the arrival of the three groups on the territory of Rwanda has been described by a number of scholars who mostly managed to agree on some historical events. In his book "*Rwanda Before the Genocide*", James Jay Carney provides us with a number of important analysis of scholar's works. He mentions that precolonial Rwanda was considered as encompassing cultural groups located mostly in today's Central Rwanda. The first settlers were the Twa, a group of pygmy people whose main occupation was hunting and gathering. They only represented 1% of total population. Although much debated, it was acknowledged the fact that Twa were pushed towards the mountains because of Bantu-speaking migrants who arrived in Rwanda after 1100. These Bantu-speaking groups came to be defined in the 19th century as Hutu. They were described as cultivators doing agricultural work. Historians moved on to associate the migration of Tutsi who were originally coming from Ethiopia or Egypt after the migration of Hutu, between 1100 and 1650. The latter were considered to be pastoralists who were focused on growing cattle but migrated to Rwanda in an effort to conquest the region (Carney, 2013).

The migration hypothesis also supported the "differences argument". Colonial anthropologists indicated the proof of different ancestors and different

waves of migration in terms of physical weight and appearances of both groups. Therefore, the evidence suggested that Tutsi were taller than Hutu with around a 12-centimeter difference height. Also, they were thinner and had more narrow features, while Hutu were shorter and stronger. Twa were generally very short, and were attributed to pygmies, who are known for their unusual height of less than 150 cm. Other historians and scientists moved on to claim that the physical appearances is due to pastoralist and agriculturalist occupation, thus Tutsi benefiting from raising cattle and eating more proteins while Hutu having less meat and milk, mostly living out of vegetable nutrients (Mamdani, 2001).

In any case, the migration thesis was more a political fact rather than a historical one. Thus, it was highly debated and contested because of its implication of “who came first, who came after” that was meant to underline of the group’s supremacy. Eventually, all this evidence comes from examining old ancestors’ characteristics which led to the assumption that Hutu and Tutsi are two distinct ethnic and racial groups when in fact, before colonization these differences were not so evident and they lived together, spoke the same language and even inter-married.

The early form of organization was the clan whose members were loyal to a leader and the composition of these clans was based on lineages. What is important to note that despite clan’s differences, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa shared the same language, Kinyarwanda, the same religion and the same culture. (Desforges, 1999) It is essential to address the fact that despite the later constructed differences, at the origins, before having contact with a foreign nation there were no considerable conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi.

The period before 19th century was not notable for the construction of Tutsi superiority. It was only after the King Kigeli Rwabugiri come to rule the Kingdom of Rwanda and impose the first differential treatment on Hutu population. It was during the period of his reign that the state came to be highly expanded through military campaigns. Previously autonomous Hutu parts were incorporated into the Kingdom of Rwanda. Before being conquered, the so-called “Hutu” did not identify themselves under this name, but they called themselves “Bakinga, the people of the mountains” under the term “Banyanduga”. Rwabugiri also structured the country into provinces, districts and hills which were ruled through an administrative machinery by a hierarchy of chiefs, mostly Tutsi. Soon.

Hutu’s inferiority was propagated in every sphere of life. But Rwabugiri introduced an innovative system that would prevent any Hutu retaliation. This system was called “kwihutura” and meant that any Hutu can become Tutsi after reaching certain steps (Mamdani, 2001). Moreover, the term “Hutu” actually meant “subject” or “servant” in Kinyarwanda, while “Tutsi” referred to a person who has cattle, therefore someone who is superior because wealth was measures in terms of how many cattle a person has. Eventually, even Tutsi who offended the king were snatched from their cattle and became farmers, therefore known as Hutu (Smith, 1995). It is important to recognize how the two groups have been constructed in opposition with one another and how Hutu did not reflect a reality before being integrated in the Rwabugiri’s state.

The characteristics of Tutsi-led Rwanda were formerly imposed by Rwabugiri and had the dramatic consequence of resisting until Hutu Revolution in 1959. But it was during the German and Belgian colonial rule that the ethnic cleavages and racial segregation was dominantly imposed in Rwanda. The intensity of inequality grew at a point where Hutu were no longer accepted in the society because they constituted the “muddy base”, while Tutsi were far superior, aristocratic group. In 1894 Rwabugiri died and King Musinga replaced him. His rule would have been influenced by the foreign colonial administration starting with 1899. At the moment Rwanda was annexed by Germany and was rule through an indirect system that further encouraged preferential treatment of Tutsi in all spheres of life. German occupation-imposed taxes upon the population and Hutu were now liable also to the foreign rulers. The administration was over soon and come to be replaced with the Belgian ruling after First World War (Smith, 1995).

One of the most important aspect that changed during German and Belgian colonial rule was the introduction of the so-called “Hamitic hypothesis” which has underlined the origins of Tutsi superiority. This approach was launched to further increase the division between Tutsi and Hutu. Respectively, it implied that Tutsi have descended from Southern Ethiopia and are closely connected with Middle East and Ethiopia. The search for origins went even further to conceptualized the Tutsi as being of Caucasian race, therefore closer to their European rulers. The hypothesis was constantly communicated to the rest of the population, through education and with

the help of Catholic missionaries to perpetuate the distinctiveness also in terms of race. Thus, firstly, it was the occupation which was presented a critical difference, Hutu being mainly cultivators, poor farmers who lived on agriculture, while Tutsi were pastoralists with their main possession being cattle. Secondly, because an ethnic difference was hard to prove due to the same language, same traditions and same culture and inter-marriages, race was becoming the main feature that should separate them. With the help of colonial anthropologists, the migration hypothesis doubled the Hamitic hypothesis which underlined superior Tutsi traits. Therefore, this is how colonial powers constructed an imaginary identity of a ruling class which paradoxically was a minority in the country with only 14% Tutsi. But the same arguments have been used by Hutu extremists to justify the genocide against the minority Tutsi, underlying their foreign, outsider origin. In this way, the writings of colonial elites have been used to justify the harsh treatment of both sides based on inaccurate historical assumptions (Klinghoffer, 1998)

Additionally, the racial segregation was induced also through institutions. The two main channels through which racial ideology was propagated was through the school system, that is through education and through local administration. Mamdani Mahmood in his book *"When Victims Become Killers"* makes the connection between the two institutions. By 1905, the first foreign school was opened up by the colonizers and was mainly attended by Tutsi children. By 1930's, the Christian missions already took control of the schools with small percentage of Hutu children being admitted to the classes. The latter category was restricted from receiving French language courses because knowing the French language was associated with the acquiring of citizenship and positions in the administrative system and instead they received inferior education to maintain their positions as uneducated, peasants and subjugated group (Mamdani, 2001).

The coordination of racial distinctions become even more significant in the 1930's when identity cards have been introduced to successfully determine which person is a Hutu or a Tutsi. It is said that the persons who possessed at least 10 cattle is a Tutsi. This system was maintained for 60 years and originally it was imposed to discriminate the Hutu, but paradoxically it become the main instrument for targeting Tutsi during the genocide (Thompson, 2007). Following years of subjugation, the prelude

of genocide emerged. By November 1959, a group of Hutu retaliated against some Tutsi chief and the conflict arose between the two sides. Before Belgian troops intervened, the uprising already caused a number of deaths.

Ethnic violence erupted in such a way that Belgian rulers began to switch sides and offered Hutu more positions in the administration. This has contributed to the 1961 upheaval led by Belgian-Hutu forces who overruled the monarchy and proclaimed the Republic under Hutu dominance. (Totten and Parsons, 2008). The revolution was just the beginning of a planned massacre that would mainly use the methods and instrument that previously ruling Tutsi used against Hutu. The Belgian colonial power acknowledging the power a majority group retains, rapidly shifted sides and came to support Hutu in their fight.

THE GENOCIDE

The radicalization of violence was generated with the invasion of Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) on the 1st of October 1990. Stemming from the economic decline, the RPF seized the opportunity of leading a strike against the vulnerable population. The military group has conducted serious preparations by recruiting a large number of Tutsi supporters who have felt the burden of being refugees in another country. The attacks were headed towards the capital and planned to advance throughout the country but the national army backfired and escalated the conflict. Even though the assaults were sudden, rumors that Habyarimana had knowledge of them sparked the public. It was considered that the strategy was to exaggerate the conflict and to present to his supporters the image of a common enemy who threatens their country. The aim was to rapidly drive away and kill the remaining Tutsi from Rwanda. Three days later as the shooting continued, the government announced that the country is being attacked by Tutsi infiltrators and RPF who want to break down their stability. Some 13.000 people have been arrested because they were considered traitors so the state must ensure security. In addition, in a desperate attempt to influence and to push as many Hutu in the battle, the leader started to assault and accuse also moderate Hutu who were considered also accomplices just like Tutsi because they refused to cooperate, or because they spoke against the regime. (Desforges, 1999, p. 42-44)

Nevertheless, the organized violence was coming from both sides, but Hutu did not act alone, but was

benefiting from the support of external donors. The main actors who contributed to the Civil War were France, Belgium, and Zaire. The help was provided in terms of military capabilities with troops actively fighting and targeting Tutsi within the country. The President anticipated that he would be backed by his allies and therefore he managed to have the RPF retreat. There have been more channels which contributed to the nurturing of hatred between the groups. The propaganda was now mainly distributed through the Radio Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) who constantly sent messages about infiltrators who have to be punished.

French troops and diplomats remained in the country to actively support the government after the RPF attack. The country was seriously facing an economic collapse while also being pressured to democratize and form alliances with opposition parties for the creation of a transitional government. Following discussions, a coalition of the major political parties was formed who was led by Habyarimana's party (Thompson, 2007, p. 2-25). Eventually, by June 1992 the Organization for African Unity alongside western allies pushed for the opening of negotiations between the newly-formed coalition government and RPF. Habyarimana reluctantly agreed to have the actors moderate the discussions about direct power-sharing agreements, while still recruiting new young members to increase its militia groups.

The peace talks were taking place in Arusha with Tanzania being the head-mediator of the negotiations. The first point on the agenda was to immediately reach a cease-fire between the two groups because RPF military offensive managed to displace 350.500 civilians out the country. (Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 26). A border-monitoring mission was the fastest solution that had to be taken and by August 1992, this was the first concession made. The second point on the agenda was also successfully concluded with the parties committing to the values and principles of rule of law, democracy and national unity so the power-sharing could be grounded on a legal document. But, by September the most important compromise was not reached as the power-sharing protocols faced a deadlock. RPF proposed that for the agreement to pass, President's powers should be revoked and the executive powers to be shared by the President along with the Prime-minister. In addition, many of the dictatorial prerogatives should be stripped away from Habyarimana. The requests sparked a lot of

controversies about the Prime Minister's relation with RPF who have been accused of conspiring against Habyarimana. As the animosities increased, the negotiations stalled while the armed factions openly attacked each other in the streets while protests erupted before the government building. Another assault led by RPF completely broke the cease-fire while the national army was more outnumbered and Kagame managed to control more territory. By August 1993, the agreement was finally reached after another year of struggles and reversed course. The temporary triumph had been the result of international actors who put pressure on the President who feared donor nations will withdraw all funds from the region. Repatriation of refugees, respect for rule of law, the integration of all armed forces were among the most crucial changes to the current status-quo. The newly formed transitional government was now a combination of the Habyarimana's party, National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND), the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and Republican Democratic Movement (MDR) (Lahneman, 2004, p. 463-479). The monitoring of the cease-fire and the movement towards the transitional government was supervised by the United Nations through its first mission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) deployed in October 1993. As the presence of United Nations was strictly restricted to supervision, the failure was doomed from the onset as the dispatched western forces had limited responsibilities.

Resolution 872 was intended to create the space for the peaceful transition of powers but relying solely on the implicated parties of the Arusha agreements. According to the document,

"United Nations should, at the request of the parties and under peaceful conditions with the full cooperation of all the parties, make its full contribution to the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement".

But, its "full contribution" was strictly limited to supervising the cease-fire, monitoring the security in the area and providing assistance in coordinating humanitarian relief. In addition, the peace-keeping mission was also allowed to investigate the acts of the National Police and Army (UNDL, 1993).

By November, General Romeo Dallaire arrived in Rwanda to lead the peace-keeping mission. As he recognized in his book, he had no experience in peacekeeping mission, nor in conflict mediation, but

rather he had been heavily trained in war-fighting. Nonetheless, he was still appointed to carry it out, but with limited military capability as he mentioned: *"In UN terms, the mission was to be small, cheap, short and sweet"* (Dallaire, 2003, p. 89). The situation was already critical because the cease-fire was the only motive that kept the opponents from engaging in direct confrontation. But that did not impede the other militias and groups who were "unofficially recognized" as partisans to the government or the RPF from launching attacks on important targets, be they cities or even civilians or political actors within the country. The Rwandan parties considered the mission as being unsatisfying for the installation of a peace process. The Arusha Agreement envisaged United Nations Security Council as deploying more troops that would perform broad security roles within all the territory of Rwanda. Instead, UNAMIR was only given permission to create weapons-secure area within Kigali. As regards the rest of the country, demobilization of troops was not entirely granted (Lahneman, 2004, p. 484-485). UN actors failed to understand the raw reality of what is actually happening in Rwanda. There was no plausible way to enforce the agreements as the opposing parties' relations had worsened and the rate of killings grew at an unimaginable scale. The foreign leaders had access to authentic information, thus they knew what really going on in the country, but failed to properly act.

Finally, by the end of the day, a dramatic event shaped the history of Rwanda. Rwanda's president airplane was shut down, killing Habyarimana and the President of Burundi. The plane crash triggered the inception of the 100 bloody days. The country was facing a civil war now and a genocide. UNAMIR had neither the mandate, nor the military force to intervene. The carefully structured execution of Tutsi and moderate Hutu indicated that the moment had been seriously planned before the death of the Hutu's leader. Every opponent was the target of search-and-murder missions while UNAMIR was left with no powers. Just as it was predicted by Dallaire's cable, the Hutu militia attacked the blue helmets and managed to kill 10 Belgian soldiers. The Belgian government responded as the militia anticipated and withdrew their forces from the UNAMIR troops. At that point, the mission was cut up to 450 officers who stayed in the region for two more months. (Thompson, 2007, p. 26-29). Finally, on April 21, Resolution 912 was passed, the majority of UNAMIR officers were pulled

back, with only 264 men being still dispatched in the field to *"act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire"*. Moreover, the members condemned the killings and demanded a cessation of hostilities. (UNDL, 1994).

UN officials still continued to send reports to the Secretary General about the situation in Rwanda. The documents detailed how Tutsi were systematically slaughter in an effort to finally eliminate them. The methods clearly indicated that the killings were based entirely on ethnicity and the country was facing a genocide. The Council was already held accountable for the poor decision to decrease the UNAMIR personnel, while the public opinion expressed serious concerns about the human right violations. Being under constant pressure, the Security Council adopted on 17 of May, Resolution 918, introducing UNAMIR II, deciding to

"contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations" (UNDL, 1994).

By June, another Resolution was put forward to finally deploy 5500 troops to Rwanda to provide increased security to refugees, displaced persons and civilians. The mission's goal was to deliver humanitarian aid but force would only be used under Chapter VII if violence would be pointed towards the UNAMIR II officers (UNDL, 1994).

While UNAMIR II still lagged behind, France decided to launch "Operation Turquoise" on June 22, a humanitarian assistance mission who would create a safe-zone in the south-west region. French government only allowed the force to act after it had Security Council's approval to intervene. Following discussion, Resolution 929 granted authorization to the French mission. Notwithstanding, there were strict rules: the officers would be restricted from engaging into conflict and the troops are to be deployed at the border with Zaire and not within Rwanda. The operations would be concluded within two months before UNAMIR II would take the lead (Thompson, 2007, p. 29).

Nicholas J. Wheeler noted that while the Council's member did not openly criticize the humanitarian concern that France so vocally supported, the western media and the human rights NGOs felt reluctant to

believe the “saving lives” motive for launching such an operation. The reasoning was referring to the many occasions when France voted alongside other UN member to cut down UNAMIR’s operational force, while there was clear evidence that the situation had worsened and needed international support. It came into the public eye how the government managed to mobilize in just a matter of days when its ally was facing a deadlock, but when Habyarimana perpetuated vicious murders against Tutsi, France stepped back. Indeed, the newly-created safe-zone was only allowing Hutu refugees to receive humanitarian assistance, while RPF militants were pushed back (Wheeler, 2000, p. 231-235).

Already in July, RPF troops controlled almost all the regions in Rwanda, while UNAMIR II could not protect the lives of those in danger and the 4 million people who were displaced in the neighbouring countries. Thus, UN finally decided to withdrew UNAMIR on the 8th of March 1996, following the RPF victory in Rwanda. In Gerard Caplan’s words,

“The facts are not in question: a small number of major actors could have prevented, halted or reduced the slaughter. They include France in Rwanda itself; the United States at the Security Council, loyally supported by Britain; Belgium, whose soldiers knew they could save countless lives if they were allowed to remain in the country; and Rwanda’s church leaders.” (Thompson, 2007, p. 29).

The massacres produced 800,000-1,000.000 deaths and huge human displacement with tragic consequences for the entire Great Lakes region.

RESPONSIBLE ACTORS AND MORAL DUTIES

As I previously mentioned, I believe there is a universal moral responsibility to prevent or to suppress humanitarian crisis. The issue goes on with the debate around who is a moral agent, thus towards whom are these moral responsibilities linked? As I presented, there are numerous approaches to moral duties, but I adopted the liberal, cosmopolitan view of egalitarian, universal moral obligations. Thus, firstly, the individual can be attributed with ethical imperatives because he possesses a conscience, rationality and has the ability to act based on altruist feelings. Moral agency is much broader, but these are the main characteristics that I agree with. Therefore, a moral agent has the capacity for moral deliberation and moral action. Thirdly, I believe a state also has these two capacities and ideally,

would act in the name of human individuals who are definitely moral agents. Thirdly, institutions, in the sense of formal organizations can also be considered moral agents because they also retain the above mentioned capacities as there is a decision-making structure which indicates the deliberative competence (Erskine, 2004, pp. 5-37). Hence, I perceive the states and international organizations as being bounded by moral responsibilities due to their position as moral agents. Ultimately, states and international organizations’ core objective is to represent the interests of the individuals. It is when individual cannot act because of their lack of power, they form institutions to further increase their position. Thus, states and institutions should respond to the individual’s moral duties.

Moreover, there are also legal responsibilities stemming from the Genocide Convention of 1948. This document was signed by France, Belgium, United Kingdom, United States of America and other states. Article 1 stated

“The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish “,

thus explicitly pointing towards genocide prevention, not only punishment. Therefore, even though individual state actors deny the authenticity of the moral responsibility, this act underlines the same responsibility, but under legal terms which were accepted by the signatories (UN, 1948).

In his book, *“Can Institutions Have Responsibilities?”*, Toni Erskine discusses about who responsible the western states are for the intensification of conflict. More specifically, he argues that France had been an accomplice to the events which eventually led to genocide. France is perceived as being an “external bystander” that retained a great degree of responsibility for failing to protect the Rwandans and for not suppressing the conflicts. Without reservation, France acted against his past commitments to the Genocide Convention and involved its citizens in a Civil War. Thus, based on the criteria that Toni Erskine presented, France can be held accountable for its actions. There is also a collective responsibility of the French government although it acted through its ambassadors, policy-makers, soldiers and other officials, but notwithstanding all represented French foreign policy. To determine the

degree of responsibility a state bears, we must look at three criteria: knowledge of the situation, the level of involvement and the capability to intervene. The first criteria, involvement can be traced back to pre-colonial period when France contributed as long as it served its interest, France would intervene (Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2014). And as a consequence, it did when Operation Turquoise was launched, under the guise of humanitarian intervention. In fact, the French troops have been creating safe-zones for Rwandans, mainly for the remaining Hutu population. While it might be true that the mission managed to save some lives, it was largely criticized for its “humanitarian motives” who were false (Wheeler, 2000, p. 239).

I consider the designation of France as being an “external bystander” to be justifiable in terms of its actions and lack of responsibility. The lack of moral responsibility in preventing the genocide from happening corresponds to the realist paradigm. The model indicates that states can only survive if they protect their national interests and the lives of their citizens. Only if national interest is not at risk, then the duties towards other people can be taken into consideration but with minimal effort. Utilitarian theorists might consider the Operation Turquoise as being effective because it saved more lives that what not intervene would. But this is exactly the reason why I don't agree with utilitarianism when it comes to humanitarian interventions: the emphasis is placed on consequences without any regards to actual motives.

As regards United States, the memory of US soldiers losing their lives in Somalia was still alive, thus the Clinton Administration feared that the history might repeat again. He feared he would lose public's support if that risk will be placed upon again on the national soldiers. There was no mentioning of a bigger responsibility to save human lives. All government officials at the time when UNAMIR was launched, had direct information about the situation in Rwanda but nobody named it as a genocide, but rather as “total confusion”. Ironically, President Clinton during his campaign pledged to intervene when human lives are at risk, he described himself as a humanitarian. (Desforges, 1999, pp. 476-478).

Furthermore, US can be apportioned with blame for more reasons: first, it failed to intervene and live up to its pledges, second, it refused to provide the necessary technology to stop the hate propaganda through the Radio Rwanda and third, it failed to respond and acknowledge General Romeo Dallaire's

cable. Eventually, the only response was an addition of 200 troops for the UNAMIR peacekeeping mission by the end of July 1994 (Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2014). The famous “Clinton apology” revealed the clashes between its solidarist claims to support international action and its commitment to preserve national interest to support the principle of non-intervention (Vik, 2016).

Again, the action of United States can be justified in terms of the realist paradigm, as there was no national interest that permitted intervention. The moral grounds have been acknowledged and apologies were transmitted, but the memory of Somalia influenced the decision. It is imperative to underline that the motives of the unwillingness to act are also moral. The decision to not pledge the US troops to the conflict indicated a moral responsibility to protect the lives of the soldiers. But it was the US soldiers and not the Rwandans. Thus, here moral responsibility doesn't go in both ways, but the humanitarian concern is only applied for national citizens.

Regarding Belgium, the relationship with Rwanda was already in place, since the country has been colonized for so long. Thus, reminiscent of history, Belgium still wanted to remain in control or at least in connection with Rwanda. It came as no surprise when Belgium pledged to support UNAMIR with the biggest proportion of troops. The reason was simple: to retain the status of peacekeeping specialist. Even with the Belgium forces in the field, the mission was still lagging behind and made no progress as ethnic killings did not stop. Therefore, Belgium tried to convince UN that UNAMIR needs the support from other states as well, but it was met with indifference. The situation quickly changed for Belgium as well when on April 7 ten Belgian soldiers. The soldiers were protecting the Presidential Guard and the Prime-Minister (Maritz, 2012). As a consequence, On April 10, Belgium decided to withdrew their soldier from the UNAMIR mandate.

In the following days, an active campaign has to be launched with the aim of convincing UN Security Council about the complete withdrawal of all UNAMIR troops. The media also contributed to the decision, as it began to lobby for the risks of continuing the operations. The main argument for UNAMIR's pull-out was that the Arusha peace process collapsed, thus the reason for UNAMIR's intervention was no longer existent. Belgium used any means necessary to persuade the members of Security Council that

mission possess a great liability on national soldiers' lives. Although it argued that the forces have no power to stop the massacres, ironically between April 7 and 10, a force made up of French, Belgium and US soldiers rescued the remaining foreign troops on the ground. The rapid mission was considered a success as it managed to secure the lives of European and US soldiers. Nevertheless, for protecting the defenceless civilians, there was no military capability. In fact, Belgium sought the retirement of all UNAMIR forces so it would have to take up all the blame by itself (Desforges, 1999, pp. 474-476).

Therefore, once again the moral obligation to safeguard and to prevent the killing of national citizens was pushed forward as a motive to withdraw or to legitimize non-intervention in the detriment of saving Rwandans' lives. In such a way that US recalled the failure in Somalia, Belgium shifted its policy after the its soldiers were killed. It seems that the actor's behaviour also corresponds to the realist paradigm, because there was no national interest that could have fostered the continuation of Belgium's mandate.

With respect of United Nations' overall response, I believe there was another issue that impeded the Security Council for taking affirmative actions and that was the misinformation that was received from the head of UNAMIR, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh who was in Rwanda at the same time when General Dallaire was. There were two voices coming from the field which described the situation completely different. General Dallaire focused on explicitly pointing towards the large-scale massacres that were being conducted by the Rwandan Government, while Booh-Booh claimed that the situation was tense, but failed to transmit information about the organized campaign of terror. Although there was a humanitarian, natural mission, political networks seemed to be at play here as well, as the head of UNAMIR had close ties with the French, thus the reluctance in pointing and apportioning blame towards Habyarimana. The dramatic consequence of such political games was seen when UN Security Council was met with confused assessments. Nonetheless, UN decided to favour Booh-Booh's interpretations and name the actual genocide as a "chaos", therefore they clearly showed how unready they were to halt the slaughter. Eventually, the mission was cut down in force and the main objective was to instal a cease-fire but virtually everyone in New-York knew that was just a shield measure to divert the Human Rights Organizations' criticism (Desforges, 1999, pp. 478-480).

United Nations failure became of the biggest disappointments of the liberal cause of global politics. Although it pledged to protect the lives of innocent men and women, the organization broke down on its promises. Largely perceived as a humanitarian forum highly capable to enforce international action to suppress the crimes against humanity, in reality United Nations is as powerful as its members allow it to be. The moral controversies around the dilemma to intervene were the reluctance to address the crimes and massacres as "genocide" because of the greater responsibility that it would entail. The indecisive actions can be attributed to the communitarian theory. According to the, there is a legitimate moral obligation to intervene when that obligation is a norm accepted by the community.

MORAL DEBATES AFTER THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

In 1999, the leader of the newly formed government, Paul Kagame, sought to address the situation with a program of national unity and reconciliation. He launched a multi-dimensional program to restart the economy, bring peace and prosperity to the citizens. The so-called National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) was created to mainly "*establish and promote mechanisms for restoring and strengthening the Unity and Reconciliation of Rwandan*" (NURC, 1999). Although Kagame was a fierce fighter of telling the absolute truth, the government used a certain version of history that included apportioning blame to former colonial master that fostered the hatred between the two groups. The program was considered a success as it managed to revitalize the country's economy, but it not enough attention was placed on the ethical imperatives and moral damages that such atrocities forged, especially on the violence that Rwandans faced by the hands of RPF's soldiers. The continuous assertion that only Tutsi died in the genocide is highly advanced in public discourses, radio broadcasts, cartoons, theatres and through other forms of communication (Thomson, 2014).

Despite of the liberalizing discourse about freedom to speech, as it in envisioned in the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda, Article 38,

"Freedom of press, of expression and of access to information are recognised and guaranteed by the State. Freedom of expression and freedom of access to information shall not prejudice public order, good morals, the protection of the youth and children, the right of every citizen to honour and dignity and protection of personal and family privacy" (CP, 2015),

but in reality the freedom is largely constrained by the exceptions imposed by the President. Such exceptions are entitled divisionism's practices and they prohibit the use of any category such as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in public. The measure was implemented to cut down the historical, problematic, ethnic cleavages and have a population that is fully Rwandan. The enforcement of a collective national unity might seem as a suitable practice, but agenda behind it indicates otherwise. In reality, the crime of divisionism is being specifically used to silence the opposing voices that criticize the regime. Anyone who tries to bring an argument against the government is considered to perpetuate genocide denial and faces criminal charges, imprisonment and fines. Despite economic, environmental and social improvements, Rwandans did not retain all the rights that they were promised, as a great proportion of them were prohibited under the umbrella of divisionism. Moreover, the expectations would be that Rwanda's government would place a greater importance on human rights after experiencing Genocide, but as I indicated above, one of the pillars of a democratic, liberal society is under censorship. Instead, the means of communication are used to propagate imposed ideas.

Moreover, there is a greater tendency for people having greater expectations for moral responses to human rights violations, as expressed in the official apologies of leaders, in the continuous trails, in the reconciliation and reparations offered. Perhaps, all the discourses have a rather political aim than a truly moral one, but still, the perpetrators are being held accountable for their actions and this can be perceived as an amplification of previously moral dilemmas. In addition, another aspect comes forward along with the contemporary debates about moral responsibility, the necessity to demarcate between victims and perpetrators. Within the academical circle and politics, it is considered that the line is not clear enough because mass killings between the two groups took place in the past and the roles have been switched which in turn led to the escalation of massacres. Even today, there are critics who challenged the mainstream position that Hutu conducted the genocide against Tutsi (Vollhardt, 2012, pp. 133-137).

Therefore, for the internal case, the genocide underscored the government's old practices of decreasing the importance of human rights and especially of freedom of speech, when at the level of UN, the tendency goes into an opposite direction.

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE AND ITS MORAL DEBATES

At the international level, I believe the genocide reaffirmed the moral and legal duties to counteract human rights' abuses. It was not until 2005 when heads of state decided to unanimously adopt the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle at the World Summit. But the concept is the product of numerous attempts and debates to finally coin such a concept that can respond to the contemporary global problems (UN, 2005).

International law, after World War conceived the Genocide Convention, which was signed in 1947 and then the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 was being adjusted. These international acts have been signed by the majority of western states who pledged to a responsibility to prevent crimes against humanity. The acts came after a period of increased violence, racism and ethnic cleansing. The Holocaust forced the international community to create binding rules and restore humanity's faith through these legal instruments. But unfortunately, the measures have not been successful enough, as the history repeated itself with the Rwandan genocide. It is clear that states ignored the assurance made years ago and acted upon national interest, thus leading to humanitarian crisis.

The norm during Cold War was the respect for sovereignty and non-intervention, thus fewer humanitarian interventions have been conducted before 1990's. The realist ideology defined international politics as state actors did not regard the loss of foreign lives as a state interest, let alone the universal responsibility to halt the massacres. Therefore, the UN was unable itself to deliver the commitments because as I mentioned previously, the states are giving power to the institution. Rwanda was just one example, but there were others too, such as Kosovo, Srebrenica, Somalia, East Timor and other cases where the international community failed to respond to the abuses of human dignity (Bellamy and Dunne, 2016, p. 3-6). Yet, these terrible events might have brought a priority for reshaping ideas and ways of addressing human's rights grave violations.

By 1999, already the first speeches regarding new concepts emerged that indicated the international community's propensity towards taking affirmative action in preventing crimes against humanity, civil wars, external and internal displacement, ethnic cleansing and other threats to human morality. Thus, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, spoke in front of the General Assembly,

“State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty [...] has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them (UNSC, 1999).

It was the first declaration that publicly transmitted the message that sovereignty should come after protection of individuals and their rights, thus highlighting that the UN system will be expecting a reform.

It was not until 2001 when the breakthrough came. The new path has been officially established when the Canadian government launched the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which put forward an outstanding initiative to rethink how we approach humanitarian interventions, the *“Responsibility to Protect”* report. The main objective was to finally reach a consensus so the norms would be accepted and put in practice by the actors. The rules through which states should guide themselves have been listed under three pillars:

“1) states have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens from crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and war crimes, (2) the international community has the responsibility to assist states in fulfilling their responsibility to protect citizens, and (3) the international community has the responsibility to react to human rights violations if states are unable or unwilling to fulfil their responsibility through political or economic sanctions, and use of force as a last resort” (ICISS, 2001).

The pillars reemphasized the primary duty of states to protect their own citizens and the residual, secondary responsibility to respond to grave human right’s violation but only if that state is unwilling to provide the protection, thus the right to non-intervention is lost. The novelty was the adapted language, from the “right to intervene” to “responsibility to protect” which showed that now attention is placed on the victim, on the moral implications of such acts. As Gareth Evans, one of the ICCIS’s Commissioners notes,

“the whole point of embracing the new language of “the responsibility to protect” is that it is capable of generating

an effective, consensual response to extreme, conscience-shocking cases in a way that “right to intervene” language simply could not. We need to preserve the focus and bite of “R2P” as a rallying cry in the face of mass atrocities” (Evans, 2008, p. 65).

In addition, it was also recognized that military force is an option to halt the massacres, but the Commission addressed some criterion according to which, the military intervention can be judged: *“the just cause threshold, the precautionary principles, right authority and operational principles*. In summary, the military force can be used only for humanitarian reasons, after all the non-military choices have been exhausted and in a manner which can lead to a successful cessation of the disturbing events while proving the minimum necessary and not more to secure the affected area. The third criterion assigns UN as being the most suitable body for authorizing such interventions. The fourth criterion underscores the most important principles for engaging with responsibility to protect in the external intervention. Among them, I believe the most crucial is the *“Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal communications and chain of command”* because this was one of the main reasons that were advanced by the international actors when faced they were blamed for not responding to the genocidal crimes, that of a lack of information about the critical situation. (ICISS, 2001).

As of April 2004, another reassurance was made at a memorial conference form Secretary-General Kofi Annan who introduced his Action Plan to Prevent Genocide with the occasion of International Day of Reflection on the Rwandan Genocide. The plan laid the basis for the creation of the position of Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide who would act as a mediator and advisor in conflict resolution. In addition, the participants also drew attention on the need to transform the lessons into successful practices, thus into a formal paradigm of responsibility to protect (International Peace Academy, 2004). But it was only in 2005 when finally, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) became a legal instrument which was unanimously adopted at the 2005 World Summit. (UN, 2005).

The legal principle was incorporated in Paragraphs 138-139 within The Summit’s Outcome Document which confirmed:

”138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes,

ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it [...]” 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity [...]. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out”(United Nations, 2005).

The assertion was considered a global standard for guidance in the following humanitarian crisis. The concept has been largely criticised but also supported. Still, neither side can contest that a step forward was achieved for a deeper understanding of moral obligations towards the entire humankind.

R2P was continuously invoked in the following years by Security Council through its Resolutions, but also by the newly appointed Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon who published several reports about roles, arrangements, duties and implementation developments. The topic was highly debated as new challenges arose, especially in Kenya in 2007, as the country faced an escalation of violence due to accusations of corrupted national elections. The Secretary-General immediately pointed the situation as being under R2P's umbrella and urged the individual states “*to meet their responsibility to protect the civilian population*” or otherwise they will be held accountable for not respecting the international law (Evans, 2008, p. 50-51).

As it can be observed, the codified norm has been largely supported by United Nations who struggled to drive the actors towards reacting to gross violations of human's rights. I believe this position suggests a shift towards a cosmopolitan approach. As Samuel James Wyatt suggests

“The decision to focus on human protection is a consequence of the norm's engagement with the maxim of atrocity prevention and incorporation of the principles of distributive global justice which, as will become clear, provide a further source of congruence between R2P and cosmopolitan human protection.

However, there are still some actors who don't fully recognise the importance of human security, actors who have been employing the realist approach to support the traditional meanings of sovereignty. This path is suggested in the previous actions of Donald Trump and Viktor Orban, in the United Kingdom's decision to withdraw from EU and others who favoured a less cosmopolitan interpretation of international politics and disregarded the importance of collective action in the face of genocide.” (Wyatt, 2019, pp. 3-10).

I endorse the assumption that the genocide generated new debates about the moral responsibility to protect human suffering and that these debates are moving into the direction of accepting that this duty is a global, universal and that individuals are expecting the states to further respond to these claims.

CONCLUSION

Although 1990's was the decade of humanitarian interventions, the motives have been largely considered as being more related to state interests and less with humanitarian concerns. History has proven that states, who conventionally are the owners of sovereignty lose the right to non-interference into their internal jurisdiction when they fail to protect their own population against massive human's rights abuses. Thus, the attacked civilians remained without any defence in the face of targeted attacks as the actual government are perpetuating them, as it was in the case of Rwanda.

Rwanda experienced one of the most terrible genocides as in just 100 days lost 800.000 people. The reasons are still the object of debate nowadays, but somehow all academics agree on the fact that the hatred have been exacerbated and constructed by European colonizers, because before becoming a colony, the two groups, Hutu and Tutsi were not divided. They intermarried, worked and collaborated together and participated in public life. The external interference exacerbated the imaginary differences and created the space for conflict. After decades of struggles, in 1994 the violence quickly escalated at a higher point. The reaction from the international stage was too slow and the effort was not enough. In no way could have forced been authorised by United Nations Security Council to intervene in the conflict. However, neither the diplomatic, soft measures have been used to prevent and stop the genocide.

This paper's focus draws on the moral implications that the genocide, the UN humanitarian missions and France's mission revealed. The results were dramatic because there was little emphasis on the human suffering of foreign nationals, but rather more attention was placed on safeguarding and protecting the lives of own soldiers. Actually, the whole inquiry comes down to two questions: Is nationality a leading factor when it comes saving human lives? Why some lives count more than others and is this morally acceptable? Or, perhaps this argument was imposed to further cover the true interest of the western actors.

Regardless, since the media and the academic circle started to denounce international actor's acts, some states came forward to express their apologies. In fact, the latest country who came forward was France as President Macron asked for forgiveness and recognized that France had a moral responsibility to stop the atrocities but failed. If apologies would be met with successful preventative action in the case of future humanitarian crisis, then we can argue that there is a value in the words of President Macron.

The results of my research are organized in such a way as to provide answers to the questions proposed. Therefore, I determined the implications of the most important theories on humanitarian interventions posed by the relevant authors, thus what are the differences between utilitarianism, communitarianism, realism, liberalism and cosmopolitanism. As regards the moral controversies, at the level of United Nations, the agenda now includes a more optimistic,

results-oriented concept which is legally incorporated that obliges UN members to respond to human rights violations.

The failure to intervene is still at the centre of debates nowadays. However, history has been the instrument to present different positions about the truth which of course are the results of different state interests. Therefore, the main limits of my dissertation were the lack of neutral, unbiased articles about the chain of events. There were little accounts of the genocide coming from authors who were truly present in the field at that moment, but rather each author interpreted the history through its own perspective and by using a different moral theory. Still, the historical analysis is not an exhaustive description because there were many angles that could have been described, but I restricted the paper to the most important circumstances. My endeavour was to select specific, checked events and then to construct an analysis by appealing to the solidarist argument. The whole paper revolves around the question of why certain actions could not be considered moral.

In conclusion, I believe that globalization brought a sense of solidarity and optimism with regard to human protection. The United Nations managed to develop a new instrument, R2P to further increase the responses to humanitarian crisis. However, the role of ethics in international relations is still developing new questions that need further analysing, although the debate between sovereignty and moral responsibility goes into the direction of the latter.

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